OR SEVERAL YEARS PRIOR to October 1979, the Federal Reserve implemented monetary policy decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) by targeting the federal funds rate. Staff of the Open Market Desk bought or sold government securities with the objective of keeping the federa' funds rate within a range specified by the P0MG at its latest meeting.
The effects of monetary policy on the economy under a procedure of targeting the federal funds rate depend on the willingness of policymakers to move the funds rate target fast enough and far enough when the pace of economic activity changes. In the 1970s, the tendency of the Fed to limit changes in the federal funds rate as the growth of total spending accelerated produced rapid money growth, resulting in accelerating inflation in the late 1970s.
In response to the accelerating inflation, the Fed in October 1979 adopted a procedure of targeting nonborrowed reserves (NBR), The FOMC stated that it adopted the NBR operating procedure to promote better short-run control of the monetary aggregates, to better control inflation.
1 Under the NBR operating procedure, the objective of the staff of the Open Market Desk was to keep the average level of NBR between FOMC meetings at levels consistent with the short~run objectives of the FOMC for growth of the monetary aggregates.
The Fed stopped targeting NBR in the fall of 1982; the operating procedure used since then is similar to targeting the federal funds rate. 2
The NBR operating procedure generated a great deal of interest and controversy among economists. There is a large literature on the conduct of monetary policy under that procedure and, in recent years, economists have continued to analyze the conduct of monetary policy during the three years ending in the fall of 1982.~Critics of the NBR procedure contend that it caused a high degree of interest rate volatility, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Some critics argue that the Fed actually did not change its operating procedure For a description of the decisions by the FOMC at ts meeting in October 1979 see Board of Governors (1979, p. 974) . 2 For a general description of the mechanics of various operating procedures, see Gilbert (1985) . Thornton (1988) provides evidence that targeting borrowed reserves has been essentially the same as targeting the federa' funds rate. The following are selected references to the literature on the NBR operating procedure: Goodfriend (1983) ; Hetzel (1982 Hetzel ( , 1986 ; Hoehn (1983) ; Lindsey (1982 Lindsey ( , 1983 ; Lindsey and others (1984) ; McCaIlum (1985) ; Poole (1982); and Spindt and Tarhari (1987) . For recent addiflons, see Avery and Kwast (1993) ! Goodfriend and SmaU (1993) and Pearce (1993 Note: Shaded area encompasses the period of nonborrowed reserves targeting in any fundamental way in October 1979.~Others blame large errors in hitting money targets on improper design of the operating procedure, especially in combination with lagged reserve accounting in effect at the time. 5
Whatever the flaws in the NBR targeting procedure as a method of monetary control, the Federal Reserve did achieve its objective of sharply reducing the rate of inflation during the period in which it used that procedure ( Figure 2 ). That success in reducing the rate of inflation, however, came at the price of a very sharp recession ( Figure 3 ). This article extends the literature on NBR targeting in two ways. First, it presents information relevant for interpreting policy actions that was confidential until several years after the end of the period of NBR targeting: Federal Reserve staff projections of total reserves (TR) over periods between P0MG meetings, and staff estimates of the levels of TR over the same periods that would have been consistent with FOMC objectives for growth of the monetary aggregates (the TR paths). 8
In addition, this article extends the literature by answering a question not answered by the other studies: Did the pattern of policy actions under the N]E3R operating procedure reflect a consistent use of the procedure for hitting short-run targets for growth of the monetary aggregates, given the information available to policymakers on staff projections of TR and estimates of the TR paths?
This article may have implications for the choice of operating procedure in the future. If the Federal Resen~echose once again to target a See Poo~e (1982) . See McCallum (1985) . Gilbert and Trebing (1982) provide a description of tagged and contemporaneous reserve accounting. 6 The weekly reports of the Manager of the Open Market Account, which included the projections and estimates of TA, became public information five years after the dates of the reports. Cook (1989a Cook ( , 1989b presents some, but not all, of the nformation on the NBR operating procedure presented in this arficle. In parficular, Cook presents nformation on the gap between projections of TR and the TA path, but he does not present the evets of those projections and estimates. Feiriman (1988) made extensive use of the data from the week'y reports of the Manager of the Open Market Account in an unpublished dissertafion. 
TARGETING NONBORROWED RESERVES
This section describes the nature of the NBR operating procedure. Most members of the FOMC at the special meeting on October 6, 1979, agreed that the degree of monetary control under the procedure of targeting the federal funds rate had become unsatisfactory. They decided to adopt instead a procedure that linked the supply of NBR to their objectives for money growth, while permitting larger fluctuations in the federal funds rate than under the previous procedure of federal funds rate targeting, 8
Ghanges in the Nature of I'OMC'
Deciswns Under the federal funds rate targeting procedure, the FOMC stated its objectives for growth of each monetary aggregate between meetings as a range of growth rates from a month before the meeting to a month after the meeting. Beginning with its meeting on October 6, 1979, the FOMC began specifying its objectives for growth of the monetary aggregates as specific growth rates over periods between meetings. Under the federal funds rate targeting procedure, in contrast, the FOMC stated its objectives for money growth as ranges of growth rates of the monetary aggregates.
Although the FOMC continued to specify ranges for the federal funds rate under the NBR operating procedure, the ranges were widened substantiafly. For most periods, the range was 400 basis points, compared with ranges of 50 to 100 basis points under the federal funds rate operating procedure. The role that the wider ranges for the funds rate played in the operating procedure is unclear. On several occasions, the FOMC widened the range on the federal funds rate when the rate threatened to move outside the range. On other occasions, the federal funds rate was allowed to move outside its range for short periods of time.°A t each meeting, the FOMC also made an assumption about the average level of borrowed reserves over the period until the next meeting. The staff used this "borrowings assumption" in deriving the target level for NBR.
Staff Projecti mis of TR and Estimates of the TR Path
After each FOMC meeting, the staff would estimate the average level of TR that would be consistent with the FOMC's objectives for growth of monetary aggregates until the next meeting. This was called the "TR path." The target for the average level of NBR between FOMC meetings, called the "NBR path," was simply the TR path minus the borrowings assumption of the FOMC. The objective of the Open Market Desk was to keep the average 1eve~of NBR between FOMC meetings equal to the NBR path. 1°S
taff estimates of the TR path were based on FOMC objectives for Ml and M2 and estimates of the following: (1) currency in the hands of the public; (2) average reserve requirements on deposit liabilities in Ml and M2; (3) required reserves on bank liabilities not included in Ml or M2; and (4) excess reserves, The staff generally revised their esUmate of the TR path each week, based on new information about the factors that affected the relationship between reserves and the monetary aggregates.
Each time the staff estimated the TR path, they also projected the average level of TR over the same period. Projections of TR were based on estimates of the actual levels of the monetary aggregates between FOMC meetings and the four estimates specified above that were made in estimating the TR path. Each change in the gap between the staff projection of TR and their estimate of the TR path during an intermeeting period, therefore, reflected a change in the staff projections of the monetary aggregates. Table 1 ."
Since projections of TR and estimates of the TR path reflected information about the same four variables specified above, projections of 'FR often were revised in the same direction as the estimates of the TR path. In the three weeks ending February 27, 1980, for instance, the projections of TR and the TR path were both reduced, but by different amounts (Table 1) . Changes in projections of TR a~dTR paths over the 37 periods in Table 1 had the same signs in all but eight of the periods. These comparisons indicate that changes in projections of TR over intermeeting periods tended to reflect the same factors that caused the staff to revise its estimates of the TR path: changes in factors that affect the relationship between reserves and the monetary aggregates.
Graphical Representation of NBR Thrge ting
Implementation of monetary policy under this operating procedure is illustrated in Figure  4 , using the concepts of supply and demand for reserves and equilibrium in the market for reserves described in Appendix 2.12 Levels of TR and NBR on the horizontal axis refer to average levels for the weeks between FOMC meetings. On the vertical axis, rĩs the level of the discount rate and rĩs the level of the federal firnds rate. The TR path is illustrated as 11*. The NBR path is N, based on a borrowings assumption of W minus N. The objective of the Open Market Desk was to keep the average level of NBR over intermeeting periods close to the NBR path.
TR wouki he at the path level R* if the demand Although the Federal Reserve began using the NBR operating procedure n October 1979. the reports of the Manager of the Open Market Accouni did not inc{ude projections of TR and TR paths on a con&stent basis unfit February 1980. Cook (1989b) discusses some of the thfficulties in deriving consistent informafion from the weekly Reports of Open Market Operations on the conduct of monetary policy in the first few weeks under the NBA operafing procedure.
12 Lindsey (1982 Lindsey ( . 1983 curve for reserves was D 1 , From that initial position. consider the effects of an increase in the demand for reserves, illustrated by a shift in the demand curve to '~2'which reflected an increase in the demand for money.
t3 TR would rise to B 1 , which is above the TR path. Since the staff of the Open Market Desk would keep NBR at the level N, the rise in TR to R 1 would involve an increase in borrowed reserves. The federal funds rate would rise from r~tor~,inducing the higher level of borrowings. Without any additional policy actions, the money stock would tend to exceed the FOMC's objectives because TR would be above the path level.
During some intermeeting periods, the Federal Reserve took no policy actions in response to changes in the demand for reserves. In the case illustrated in Figure 4 , FOMC members considered the rise in the federal funds rate from r~to an adequate response to the shift in demand for reserves, even if growth of the monetary aggregates exceeded objectives established at the last FOMC meeting.
Experience eventually convinced some Federal Reserve officials that rapid policy responses were necessary to close the gap between actual money growth and FOMC objectives once money growth started to deviate substantially from FOMC objectives.
14 During some periods between FOMC meetings, the Federal Reserve adjusted the level of the NBR path or the discount rate to reduce the deviations of the money stock from desired levels. The Federal Reserve took such policy actions when the deviations appeared to reflect more than transitory movements in the money demand schedule, perhaps due to changes in aggregate spending. 15
In the situation illustrated in Figure 5 , the staff projects TR to be R 1 , which is above the TR path (R*). The policy action illustrated in Figure 5 is a reduction in the NBR path from N 1 to N 2 , which involves an increase in the borrowings assumption from R~minus N 1 to R* minus N 2 .
Due to the inelastic demand for reserves over intermeeting periods, the average level of TR would decline to B 2 , still above the TR path, but the reduction in NBR would produce a sharp increase in the federal funds rate, The Fed could have the same effect on the funds rate and TR by keeping NBR at N 1 and raising the discount rate to r~. In taking policy actions that reduced but did not eliminate the gap between projections of TR and path levels, Fed officials emphasized the assumption that sharp increases in interest rates would, over time, reduce the quantity of money demanded. This article does not model the assumed feedback mechanism based on money demand as a function of lagged interest rates. 1°O
ne of the issues policymakers confronted in determining whether to adjust the NBR path or the discount rate when TR was projected to deviate from path levels involved their confidence in the projections of TR and estimates of the TR path. Studies conducted during the period of NBR targeting indicated large errors in these projections and estimates." These errors would tend to be smaller later in intermeeting periods, when actual observations were available for part of the periods. Observations in Table 1 are consistent with the view that the projections and estimates of TR were subject to large errors, and that the errors affected the timing of policy actions. Table 1 indicates that often there were large revisions to the projections of TR and to TR paths over intermeeting periods. Also, on those occasions when policymakers took actions between FOMC meetings, they generally acted at least two weeks after an FOMC meeting, when they might assume that the projections and estimates were more accurate.
Gni.pbical Representation of Thrgehng the Federal .Funds Rate
One way to highlight the nature of NBR targeting is to contrast the open market operations for a given situation under NBR targeting and under the procedure of targeting the federal funds rate. Suppose the demand for reserves increases, reflecting an increase iii the demand for money. Under the NBR targeting procedure, the staff of the Open Market Desk would continue to target the same average level of NER over the intermediate period (as in Figure 4 ). If the policymakers 13 If the shift in demand for reserves resulted from an increase in average reserve requirements on deposit liabilities or excess reserves, the TR path would shift to the right. The rise n the demand for reserves would not affect the federa' funds rate.
'~See Axilrod (1981, pp. A23 -A24) . 15 See Lindsey (1983, p.5).~6
For references to this feedback mechanism from changes n interest rates to changes in the quantity of money demanded, see Axijrocl (1981, p. A23) and Lindsey (1983) . 17 See Levin and Meek (1981) and Pierce (1981) .
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wished to limit the deviation of money growth from FOMC objectives, they would reduce the target level of NBR (as in Figure 5 ). Under the federal funds rate targeting procedure, in contrast, the Fed would respond to an increase in the demand for reserves by increasing the level of NBR enough to keep the federal funds rate unchanged, as illustrated in Figure 6 . This contrast provides a standard for judging whether Fed actions in the three years ending in the fall of 1982 were consistent with use of the NBR operating procedure for targeting the monetary aggregates.
INTERPRETING FEDERAL RESERVE ACTIONS
The framework of supply and demand for reserves is used to interpret monetary policy actions under the NBR operating procedure, as recorded in Cook (1989a Cook ( , 1989b do not match.
When periods between FOMC meetings were longer than five weeks, the staff divided the intermeetirig periods into two subperiods for purposes of setting TA paths and projectĩ ng the average levels of TR. The staff divided these intermeeting periods into subperiods to avoid setting weekly objectives for NBR just after an FOMC meeting based on estimates of variables for six or seven weeks into the future. The staff considered their estimates that far frito the future to be so unreliable that revisions in their estimates over intermeeting periods could generate unnecessary noise in weekĩ y objectives for NBR. were consistent with use of the NBR procedure for monetary control by examining the direction and magnitude of policy actions in relation to the gaps between the projections of TR and estimates of the TR path at the time of the policy actions. From this perspective, policy actions during the three weeks ending February 27, 1980, were consistent with use of the NBR operating procedure for monetary control. 2°A
FEDERAL RESERVE
s of February 29, the staff projected that TR would be $626 million above path level in the second intermeeting period (the three weeks ending March 19). That day, the Fed reduced its target for NBR by $300 million relative to the TR path to limit the size of this deviation of TR from the path. As a result of that reduction in the NBR path, banks were forced to obtain more of the reserves from the discount window to meet their required reserves. The federal funds rate rose by 155 basis points in the week of this policy action.
Projections later in the period indicated that the gap between TR and the path level was continuing to grow. On March 14, the Fed imposed a surcharge of 3 percent on discount window borrowings by banks with deposits of $500 million or more that borrowed frequently, as part of President Carter's program of credit controls and monetary restraint.
2 ' During this first intermeeting period examined in Table 1 , the Fed took four policy actions that were appropriate for monetary control with TR projected to exceed the path level: two reductions in the NBR path and two increases in the discount rate.
The FOMC met again on March 18, four days after President Carter announced a program of credit controls and monetary restraint. In support of the President's program, the FOMC tightened monetary policy by increasing the borrowings assumption substantially (Table 4) . With given objectives for growth of the monetary aggregates, a larger borrowings assumption implies a lower NBR path and, therefore, a more restrictive monetary policy.
As of the beginning of the period after the March FOMC meeting (that is, the five weeks ending April 23, 1980), TR was projected to be approximately equal to the TR path. Later in that period, the projection of TR was reduced and the TR path increased, producing a widening gap between projected TR and the path level. The Fed, however, took no policy actions to limit the size of that gap. The actual level of TR ended up $435 million below the final estimate of the TR path.
General Patterns in Policy Actions
Examination of policy actions in Table 1 for the entire period from February 1980 through October 1982 indicates several patterns: 22
Variable Pattern in the Use of Policy ToolsFor given staff projections and estimates of TR, policy actions were highly variable. As noted for periods examined above, widening gaps between projections of TR and path levels induced prompt and substantial adjustments of policy tools in some periods but not in other periods. To identify relevant periods when the Fed did not take policy actions, it is necessary to specify a criterion for identifying relatively large deviations of TR from the TR path. This paper uses $200 million or more as the size of a large deviation, based on the following reasoning. Over the period of NBR targeting, TR was approximately $40 billion. A gap of $200 million is one~ha1fof 1 percent of 20 The last observation for TR over each intermeeting period reflects the nformation available to Fed staff as of the end of the period. For instance, the last estimate of TR for the three weeks ending February 27, 1980, was the staff estimate as of February 27. The data for TR over iritermeeting periods reflect the information available to policymakers at the time, riot subsequent revisions to TA. 21 For more details on the discount rate surcharge, see Board of Governors (1980, pp. 315-18) . For a descñptiori of the credit control program, see Gilbert and Trebing (1981) . 22 This article does not include among the policy actions some adjustments to the supp~yof NBR which might properly be classified as policy actions. Levin and Meek (1981) mention that on some occasions the staff of the Open Market Desk based open ma~I<et operations on movements in the federal funds rate, rather than their numbers on factors aft ecUng NBR. As they describe those actions, the obect~ve was to use the federal funds rate as an indicator of errors in their numbers on factors affecting NBR. They do not indicate that these open market operations based on movements in the federal funds rate interfered with hftting targets tor NBA over intermeeting periods. Other adjustments to the supply of NBR raise more quest ions about adjustments to the supply of NOR that should be labeled as policy actions. At times, the staff adjusted the supply of NBR to prevent arge movements in borrowings and in the federal funds rate just prior to FOMC meefings. Weekly Reports on Open Market Operations mention that at times the staff did not make the full adjustments to the TR path that were ndicated by theft information on factors affecting the r&ationship between reserves and the monetary aggregates, and the reports refer to occasions when the staff deliberately allowed NBA to deviate from its path level, to avoid forcing large changes in borrowed reserves just before FOMC meetings. Table 1 Umits its ist of poflcy actions to those identified clear'y as policy actions n the Report on Open Market Operations.
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$40 billion. An error of approximately one-half of 1 percent in hitting a target for an aggregate over a month, compounded over a year, would be an error of 6 percent, which could be interpreted as a substantial error. TR deviated from the TR path by at least $200 million, and the Fed took no policy actions in response, in each of the periods after the FOMC meetings on March 18, 1980, and December 18-19, 1980. Directions of Policy Actions Were Appropriate for Monetary Control -Prior to the fall of 1932, the direction of each policy action between FOMC meetings was appropriate for monetary control. When TR was projected to be above the path level, policy actions included reductions in the target for NBR relative to the TR path or increases in the discount rate. The Fed took the opposite types of policy actions when TR was projected to be below the path level. 23
The only exception to this pattern occurred on February 25, 1981. The Fed reduced the NBR path by $166 million when the staff projected TR to be $351 million below the TR path. At that time, the growth of M2 and M3 exceeded FOMC objectives, whereas Ml was growing more slowly than the target set by the FOMC at its meeting on February 2-3, 1981. TR was below the TR path because required reserves predominately reflected the required reserves on deposits in Ml. In February 1981, the FOMC decided to put more weight on its objectives for M2 and M3 than on Ml. Therefore, the FOMC decided to reduce the supply of NBR to limit the growth of M2 and Mi This reduction in the NBR path on February 25, 1981, was consistent with use of the NBR procedare for monetary targeting, even though TR was projected to be below the path at the time of the policy action.
The change in the NBR target on September 24, 1982, in contrast, illustrates a policy action that was inconsistent with use of the NBR operating procedure for monetary control. It is generally recognized that by the fall of 1982, the Fed had abandoned use of the NBR operating procedure in favor of smoothing short-term interest rates. 24
For operational purposes, however, the staff continued to calculate the numbers that had been important for conducting policy under the NBR procedure. After the FOMC meeting on August 24, 1982, projections of TR were increased gradually relative to estimates of the TR path, and by September 24, the gap had reached $495 million. A policy action appropriate for monetary targeting would have been a reduction in NBR. Instead, the Fed increased the target for NBR, to limit the rise in short-term interest rates in response to the rise in demand for reserves. This action, the kind of policy action illustrated in Figure 6 , provides one way to date the end of the NBR operating procedure.
Size of the Policy Actions - Table 2 lists the changes in the NBR path between FOMC meetings that the Fed classified as policy actions. These changes in the NBR path generally were about half or less of the gap between TR projected by the staff and the TR path at the time of the policy actions. These observations indicate that even at those times when the Fed adjusted the NBR path as a policy action, the Fed was willing to tolerate large deviations of TR from the path over intermeeting periods. The emphasis in the policy was bringing the levels of the monetary aggregates closer to FOMC objectives over time. The policy did not call for actions to force immediate shifts of the levels of the aggregates back to the levels specified in FOMC directives.
Policy Acions Did Not Cause Al! of the Sharp Fluctuations in Interest Rates -The federal funds rate was more variable during the period of NBR targeting than in surrounding periods (Figure 1) . These large fluctuations generated a lot of complaints from market participants and from economists critical of the procedure. In evaluating NBR targeting as a method of implementing monetary policy, it would be useful to 23 Some changes in the gap between the NBR path and the TR path were abeed technical adjustments" to the supply of NBR, not poilcy actions. The purpose of these technical adjustments was to offset the effects on interest rates of changes ri the relationship between borrowings arid the spread between the federaf funds rate and the discount rate for TR. At times, the staff concluded that there were pers~s-tent changes in the quantity of reserves borrowed by banks for given spreads between the federal funds rate and the discount rate. In terms of Figures 1 and 4 , there appeared to be shifts in the slope of the supply curve of reserves. At those times, the staff adjusted the supp'y of NBR to offset possible effects on interest rates of such changes in the behavior of banks. Tab~e 1 does not nclude these adjustments to the supply of NBA because the purpose of this article s to examine patterns of policy actions under the NBR operating procedure. Reports by the Manager of the Open Market Account distinguish between technical adjustments and changes n the supp'y of NBA labeled policy actions. 24 See Thornton (1983 Thornton ( , 1988 . It is possible to determine whether the relatively large weekly fluctuations in the federal funds rate reflected the effects of policy actions by examining their timing and the timing of policy actions.
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25 Table 3 examines the pattern of policy actions during the weeks in which the federal funds rate changed by 100 basis points or more. Changes in weekly average levels of the federal funds rate of 100 basis points or more were relatively common during the three years ending in September 1982. For example, Table 3 list 29 weeldy occurrences. During the three years ending in September 1979, in contrast, there were no weeks when the federal funds rate changed by as much as 100 basis points. During the three years ending in September 1985, the three years following the period of NBR targeting, the federal funds rate changed by 100 basis points or more in only five weeks.
Seven of the relatively large changes in the federal funds rate in Table 3 occurred in the weeks just after FOMC meetings. For instance, the fedõ ral funds rate rose 154 basis points in the week ending March 26, 1980, the first week after the FOMC meeting on March 18. The decisions of the FOMC at its meeting on March 18, 1980, can be characterized as a tightening of monetary policy. Table 4 illustrates the shift in monetary policy at the FOMC meeting on March 18 in terms of an increase in the borrowings assumption relative to the level set at the prior meeting: from a level of $1.25 billion set at the meeting on February 4-5 to a level of $2.75 billion set on March 18. The rise in the federal funds rate in the week ending March 26 is consistent with a tightening of monetary policy at the FOMG meeting on March 18.
The federal funds rate fell by 244 basis points in the week ending April 30, 1980, which was the first week after the FOMC meeting on April 22. At its meeting on April 22, the FOMC decided to reverse the tightening of monetary policy at its prior meeting. Table 4 illustrates the easing of monetary policy at the meeting of April 22 with 25 Cook (1 989a, 1 989b) conducted a similar analysis of the timing of policy actions and changes n the federa' funds rate during the period of NBR targeting. Cook invesfigated the degree to which changes in the feder& funds rate over periods between FOMC meetings could be exp'ained in terms of policy actions. Cook concluded that roughiy two-thirds of the changes in the federal funds rate were due to judgmental actions of the Federal Reserve. This article, in contrast, examines the tim~ngof relativ&y large weekly changes n the federal funds rate and poUcy actions. Comparison of Tables 3 and 4 illustrate this consistent pattern: On those occasions when the federal funds rate changed by over 100 basis points in the first week after an FOMC meeting, increases in the federal funds rate coincided with increases in the initial borrowings assump~d ecreases in the federal funds rates were associated with reductions in the initial borrowings assumptions. This pattern prevailed until the fall of 1982, when the Fed had largely abandoned use of NEW targeting. Thus, some of the relatively large changes in the federal funds rate reflected policy actions initiated at the time of FOMC meetings.
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1994
Of the 29 weeks in Table 3 in which the federal funds rate changed by 100 basis points or more, 15 were not the first week after an FOMC meeting or weeks of changes in the NJ3R path or the discount rate. Many of the relatively large weekly changes in the federal funds rate, therefore, reflected the relatively low weight the Fed attached to limiting fluctuations in the federal funds rate under the NBR operating procedure. Also, the economy was very volatile during the period of NBR targeting. Influences other than the conduct of monetary policy may have contributed substantially to the variability of interest rates over this period.
CONCLUSIONS
The conduct of monetary policy in the United States from October 1979 through the fall of 1982 has important implications for the design of procedures for targeting monetary aggregates today. This is the only period in which daily open market operations were tied directly to objectives of the FOMC for growth of the monetary aggregates. It is our closest approximation to short-run monetary control in the United States. Some critics of the conduct of monetary policy in this period have concluded that errors in hitting the money targets of the FOMC reflected problems inherent in the design of the procedure.
This article presents information on the conduct of monetary policy in this period of nonborrowed reserves (NBR) targeting not avaih able in other published studies. This information includes Fed staff projections of the actual levels of total reserves (TR) over periods between FOMC meetings and staff estimates of the average levels of TR between meetings that would have been consistent with FOMC objectives for money growth (the TR paths). Using this information, we can examine the timing and size of policy actions in relation to the information available to Fed policymakers at the time.
Examination of policy actions during the period of NBR targeting yields the following SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1994 observations. First, the pattern of policy actions does not reflect consistent use of the procedure over time for monetary targeting. During some intermeeting periods in which the staff projected that TR would deviate substantially from the TR path, the Fed took no policy actions, whereas in other periods the Fed took aggressive actions consistent with monetary targeting. Second, when the Fed did take policy actions, they were in the directions appropriate for monetary controL given the staff projections and estimates available at the time. This observation contradicts assertions that there was no change in the operating procedure in October 1979. Third, the magnitude of policy actions often was small in relation to the gap between the projection of TR and the path. These three observations have implications for interpreting the three years ending iii the fall of 1982 as au experiment in monetary targeting. The commitment of policymakers to hitting short-run money targets varied over those three years. Any conclusions derived from data for those three years concerning NBR targeting as a method of monetary control should account for variation over time in the commitment of policymakers to take actions appropriate for monetary control.
The fourth observation concerns the degree of interest rate variability under a procedure of NER targeting. While several of the relatively large weekly changes in the federal ftmds rate coincided with the timing of policy actions, the Fed took no policy actions at the time of some relatively large fluctuations in the federal funds rate. hiterest rate fluctuations during the period of NBR targeting reflect use of an operating procedure which left the federa' funds rate largely unconstrained within wide bands. It is difficult to extrapolate from this experience to the degree of weekly interest rate variability that would exist under use of an NUR procedure now. This experience, however, is consistent with the view that targeting NBR for purposes of short-run monetary control would tend to increase weekly interest rate variability.
Appendix I
Illustration of Staff Projections and Estimates of Total Reserves
This appendix describes the steps involved in staff estimates of the TR path and projections of TR for the intermeeting period after the FOMC meeting on February [4] [5] 1980 . The staff divided the intermeeting period into two subperiods of three weeks each, ending on February 27 and March 18. They made such divisions when the periods between meetings were longer than five weeks to avoid using projections of variables several weeks into the future in determining the supply of NBR early in an intermeeting period.
To aid in clarifying the timing of relationships between deposits and reserves, Table Al presents a calendar of January and February 1980. At its meeting on February 4-5, the FOMC specified its short-run objectives as growth of Mi-B at a 5 percent rate and M2 at a 6.5 percent rate over the first quarter of 1980. To estimate the TR path for the three weeks ending February 27, the staff would do the following calculations:
1. Project the weekly levels of Ml and M2 growing at the desired rates from mid-December through the three weeks ending February 13. Deposits over the three weeks ending February 13 determine required reserves over the three weeks ending February 27. These weekly levels are projected from the seasonally adjusted data for December and then converted into nonseasonally adjusted levels using the seasonal factors for those weeks.
2. Estimate currency in the hands of the public, not seasonally adjusted, for the three weeks ending February 13.
3. Subtract the estimate of currency in the hands of the public from the projection of Ml to derive the level of checkable deposits, not seasonally adjusted, if Ml grew at the rate desired by the FOMC.
4.
Multiply the average level of checkable deposits as derived in step 3 by an estimate of the average reserve requirement on checkable deposits.
5. Subtract the estimate of average currency holdings as described in step 2 and checkable deposits as described in step 3 from the projection of M2, as described in step 1.
Multiply by an estimate of the average reserve requirement on deposits in M2 but not in Ml.
6. Sum estimates of required reserves as described in steps 4 and 5 and an estimate of required reserves on deposits not in M2 to derive an estimate of what required reserves would be in the three weeks ending February 27 if Ml and M2 grew at the rates specified by the FOMC at its meeting on February 4-5. Add an estimate of the average level of excess reserves for the three weeks ending February 27 to get an estimate of the TR path over the three weeks ending February 27.
The steps involved in projecting TR are similar to the steps in estimating the TR path: staff generally had data on reservable liabilities eight days after the end of a reserve maintenance week. By February 7, the date of the first projection, the staff would have had information on reservable liabilities for the week ending January 30. They would have to estimate liabilities for the weeks ending February 6 and 13. This paper describes the conduct of monetary policy under the NBR operating procedure using diagrams of the supply and demand for bank reserves.
1 This appendix describes the determinants of the supply and demand curves, and the following section uses this analytical tool to describe the mechanics of the NBR operating procedure.
Reserves available to meet reserve requirements include currency that banks hold in their vaults and their reserve balances at Federal Reserve Banks. The Federal Reserve supplies reserves. Banks demand reserves to facilitate their customers' transactions and to meet reserve requirements imposed by the Federal Reserve, which are based on the amount and composition of their liabilities.
Banks earn no interest on reserves. This article identifies the opportunity cost to banks of holding reserves as the federal funds rate, which is the interest rate that banks charge each other for lending reserves.' A bank changes its reserves by borrowing or lending at the federal funds rate.
Demand for reserves by banks is drawn as a function of the federal funds rate in Figures 4-6 . Reserve requirements on deposits included in the money stock create a close relationship between the demand for money by the public and the demand for reserves by banks. Demand for reserves, therefore, depends on reserve requirements and the demand for money.
Demand for money is assumed to be a function of total spending in the economy and interest rates. Various influences can cause shifts in the demand curve for reserves. A change in total spending in the economy, which influences the demand for money, would cause the demand curve for reserves to shift. Shifts in the demand for reserves could reflect other influences: changes in the random component of money demand; the average reserve requirement on deposit liabilities included in the money stock; reserve requirem ents on other liabilities; or the demand for excess reserves.
Elasticity of the demand for reserves depends on the relevant time period over which average reserves are measured. The demand curves for reserves in Figures 4-6 are steeply sloped because it is for a period between FOMC meetings. Over these periods, there is little time for a change in interest rates to change the quantity of money demanded, feeding back to a change in the quantity of reserves demanded.
Factors that influence the supply of reserves can be analyzed by considering separately the For convenience of exposition, the term 'bank' refers to all depository institutions. 2 Federa' funds brokers facilitate the operation of the federal funds market. These brokers receive orders from depository institutions located throughout the nation to lend or borrow reserves, and the brokers match enders and borrowers at mutually agreeable interest rates. Most of the transacfions through the federal funds market involve borrowing and lending reserves for one day. The transfers of reserves to borrowers are made the same day through wire transfer systems, ncluding the Fed Wfte of the Federal Reserve System.
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determinants of borrowed reserves and NBR. The Federal Reserve determines the amount of NBR directly through the open market operations. Banks decide the amount of reserves they borrow from the Federal Reserve, but their decisions are shaped by lending terms set by the Federal Reserve, including the discount rate and limits on the size and frequency of borrowings by individual bathcs. Banks try to avoid exceeding these borrowing limits to ensure that they maintain access to credit from the Fed to cover their short-term liquidity requirements. If a bank borrows now, it will be subjected to greater administrative pressure to limit its borrowings in the future, when the attractiveness of borrowing from the discount window might be greater. Goodfriend (1983) derives the relationship between borrowngs and the rate spread from a theoretica' framework that is based on profit-maximEzing bank behavior.
The supply curve for reserves in Figure 4 is drawn as a vertical line from the level of NBR (labeled N) up to the level on the vertical axis at which the federal funds rate equals the discount rate (~d) If the discount rate is above the federal funds rate, the amount of reserves borrowed from Federal Reserve Banks tends to be relatively low and insensitive to small changes in the federal funds rate. The supply curve of reserves is upward sloping in the range with the federal funds rate above the discount rate. Given the terms for lending set by the Federal Reserve, it takes an increase in the spread between the federal funds rate and the discount rate to induce banks to increase their borrowings from the discount wiudow.F EDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
